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Antonia Eliason*
ABSTRACT

Climate change is the greatest threat humanity has faced,
and its challenges can only be addressed through multilateral
means. Lacking in accountability and enforcement mechanisms,
however, the Paris Agreement requires additional support to
achieve its full effect. Although not perfectly aligned with the
goals of the ParisAgreement, the WTO's multilateralframework
could provide the necessary flexibilities to work toward meeting
the ParisAgreement's targets. This Article proposes a novel threepronged approachfor refocusing the multilateraltradingsystem
and facilitatingthe ParisAgreement.
First, the preamble to the Agreement Establishingthe World
Trade
Organization explicitly
recognizes
sustainable
development as a goal, seeking to protect and preserve the
environment. It also recognizes the need for developing countries
to share in the growth of international trade. Giving meaning
and effect to sustainable development is key to facilitating the
ParisAgreement. The second prong recognizes that certain types
* Assistant Professor, University of Mississippi School of Law. I would like to thank
Rend Reich-Graefe for providing invaluable insights on a very preliminary draft at the
ClassCrits X conference. I would also like to thank Rob Howse for his comments and
support, as always, as well as the attendees of the sessions at both the Society of
International Economic Law and the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics
conferences in July 2018 for their comments and insights. Finally, I would like to thank
the Fall 2017 writing group participants at the University of Mississippi School of Law,
who helped me develop this idea from its early stages and particularly Ellie Campbell
for steering me toward the works of McKenzie Wark, Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, and
Donna Haraway.
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of climate change mitigation measures may require violating
WTO rules. In such circumstances, limited carve-outs in the mold
of the public stockpiling exception relating to food security, with
additional built-in sunset provisions, would provide support for
countries working to meet their targets. Finally, the third prong
envisions the negotiation of a multilateral or plurilateral
agreement to help give effect to the ParisAgreement. Key to this
agreement would be special and differential treatment (S&DT)
provisions. The Trade Facilitation Agreement contains nextgeneration S&DT provisions, which could be leveraged in the
context of a future plurilateralor multilateral agreement to help
give effect to the ParisAgreement.
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The Anthropocene is a series of metabolic rifts, where one molecule after another
is extracted by labor and technique to make things for humans, but the waste
products don't return so that the cycle can renew itself. The soils deplete, the
seas recede, the climate alters, the gyre widens: a world on fire.
1
-McKenzie Wark
Precarity is the condition of being vulnerable to others. Unpredictable
encounters transform us; we are not in control, even of ourselves. Unable to rely
on a stable structure of community, we are thrown into shifting assemblages,
which remake us as well as our others. We can't rely on the status quo;
everything is in flux, including our ability to survive. Thinking through precarity
changes social analysis. A precarious world is a world without teleology.
Indeterminacy, the unplanned nature of time, is frightening, but thinking
through precarity makes it evident that indeterminacy also makes life possible.2
-Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing

1.

MCKENZIE WARK, MOLECULAR RED: THEORY FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE xiv

(2016).
ANNA LOWENHAUPT TSING, THE MUSHROOM AT THE END OF THE WORLD: ON
2.
THE POSSIBILITY OF LIFE IN CAPITALIST RUINS 20 (2015).
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I. INTRODUCTION

The world in which humankind lives today is one indelibly
changed by human activity, so much so that scientists have designated
a new geological epoch that began with the advent of the Industrial
Revolution: the Anthropocene.3 Climate change, which is the greatest
threat humanity has ever faced, is a result of human activity in the
Anthropocene, particularly by countries of the Global North. From
rising ocean levels to temperature increases and more frequent
extreme weather events, its effects can be seen across the globe. 4
Scientists have been ringing alarm bells for decades, but only in the
past few years has the international legal community given the issue
the attention it deserves. With the conclusion of the Paris Agreement
in December 2015, the world came together for the first time to address
the effects of climate change, with all countries recognizing the
necessity of taking measures to mitigate and adapt to the effects of
climate change.5
The challenges posed by climate change can only be addressed
through multilateral means, as climate change is a global issue in the
most immediate sense of the word. Lacking in accountability and
enforcement mechanisms, the Paris Agreement requires additional
support to achieve its full effect. In light of the trend toward
regionalism and protectionism, as well as the backlash against
globalization as income inequality continues to grow, there is a need to
find common multilateral ground. 6 Regional trade agreements
between large economies threaten to marginalize developing countries
by keeping them at the periphery of innovation either by ignoring

3.
Will Steffen et al., The Anthropocene: Conceptual and HistoricalPerspectives,
369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS. ROYAL. Soc'y. A 842, 847-48 (2011).
4.
See, e.g., Matthew Ranson, Lisa Tarquinio, & Audrey Lew, Modeling the
Impact of Climate Change on Extreme Weather Losses (Nat'l Ctr. Envtl. Econ., Working
Paper No. 16-02, May 2016) (evaluating the economic impact of climate change); Kristine
Phillips, As the eastern U.S. freezes, Sydney bakes at 117 degrees-the hottest in eight
decades, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
capital-weather-gang/wp/20 1 8 /01/0 6 /as-the-bomb-cyclone-freezes-the-eastern-u-s-aheat-wave-is-melting-asphalt-in-southern-australial?utm-term=.09a7cfl66e98
[https://perma.cc/JFF3-4ESL] (archived Feb. 24, 2019).
5.
Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/worldleurope/climatechange-accord-paris.html [https://perma.cc/TL32-K9KW] (archived Feb. 13, 2019).
6.
Larry Elliott, World's 26 richest people own as much as poorest 50%, says
Oxfam, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jan
/ 2 1/world-26-richest-people-own-as-much-as-poorest-50-per-cent-oxfam-report
[https://perma.cc/KAK4-NS3A) (archived Feb. 13, 2019). The 2018 Oxfam report noted
that the wealth of the over 2,200 billionaires increased by $900 billion in 2018, which
amounted to a 12 percent increase. In contrast, the wealth of the poorest half of the
world's population fell by 11 percent. Id.
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capacity-building issues faced by these smaller economies or by
keeping membership to such agreements closed.
At a time when multilateralism is under threat, the future of
international institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO) is
in question. Critics point to the failures of the Doha Round and the rise
in megaregional agreements as indicative of the WTO's imminent
demise. 7 Obstruction on the part of the United States to the
reappointment of WTO Appellate Body (Appellate Body) members is
jeopardizing the WTO's ability to function as a dispute-settlement
body.8 The WTO, however, is far from being irrelevant. The WTO's
multilateral framework offers a vehicle for effecting significant
progress on climate change. Besides possessing a dispute-settlement
system that is more effective than that of any other international
judicial body, despite efforts to undermine it, the WTO provides rules
and exceptions that allow for the liberalization of international trade
while leaving space for regulatory autonomy.
This Article proposes a novel approach for refocusing the
multilateral trading system and facilitating the Paris Agreement.
Although not perfectly aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement,
the WTO's multilateral framework could provide the necessary
flexibilities to work toward meeting the Paris Agreement's targets. At
the same time, such flexibilities could help address some of the
concerns regarding labor and manufacturing. There are three prongs
to using the WTO as a vehicle to achieve progress on climate change.
First, the preamble to the Agreement Establishing the World
explicitly recognizes
(WTO Agreement)
Organization
Trade
and preserve the
protect
to
seeking
goal,
a
sustainable development as
9
countries to
developing
for
need
the
environment. It also recognizes
will
countries
Developing
trade.
share in the growth in international
lack
yet
change,
climate
of
effects
the
by
be disproportionally affected
resources to adapt to and to mitigate them. Giving meaning and effect
to sustainable development is key to facilitating the Paris Agreement.
The second prong recognizes that certain types of climate change
mitigation measures may require violating WTO rules. In such
circumstances, limited carve-outs in the mold of the public stockpiling
exception relating to food security, with additional built-in sunset
provisions, would provide support for countries working to meet their
targets, allowing them the ability to break from WTO rules to support
domestic industries.
Finally, the third prong envisions the negotiation of a multilateral
or plurilateral agreement to help give effect to the Paris Agreement,

See generally, e.g., Antoine Martin & Bryan Mercurio, Doha Dead and Buried
7.
in Nairobi: Lessons for the WTO, 16 J. INT'L TRADE L. & POLY 49 (2017).
See TETYANA PAYOSOVA, GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT,
8.
PETERSON INST. INT'L ECON., THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT CRISIS IN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: CAUSES AND CURES 1 (2018).

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, pmbl.,
9.
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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much as the WTO already works in tandem with the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) in relation to the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and with the
World Customs Organization in relation to the Trade Facilitation
Agreement (TFA).10 Key to this agreement would be special and
differential treatment (S&DT) provisions. The TFA contains nextgeneration S&DT provisions, which could be leveraged in the context
of a future plurilateral or multilateral agreement to help give effect to
the Paris Agreement. These provisions include measures relating to
capacity building, centered on partnerships between developed and
developing countries, and conditional obligations, the timeframe for
implementation of which depends on the developing country's selfdesignation."
Mitigating and adapting to climate change involve costly
infrastructural investments, including shifting from fossil fuel-run
power plants to clean energy ones.
Such measures are
disproportionately costly and difficult for developing countries to
implement. With climate change mitigation measures, and arguably
even with climate change adaptation measures, every country in the
world benefits from each individual measure taken by each country.
Cooperative mechanisms are as such essential to ensure that progress
is made in meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement.
Part II 'of this Article provides a brief background to the
Anthropocene, sustainability, and the Paris Agreement. Part III
addresses sustainable development both in the multilateral trade
context and in interdisciplinary contexts to arrive at a workable
construct that equips the language in the WTO Agreement's preamble
with real meaning. Part IV looks at carve-outs from the WTO's rules
and posits how they could best be applied to climate change mitigation
and adaptation measures. Part V provides a framework for the
application of S&DT measures such as those found in the TFA to
climate change-related measures. Part VI briefly addresses some of
the challenges to the proposed tripartite approach. Finally, Part VII
offers suggestions for a broader way forward on climate change and
trade, challenging some of the status quo notions regarding free trade
and the position of trade in the global economy.

10.
Antonia Eliason, The Trade FacilitationAgreement: A New Hope for the World
Trade Organization,14 WORLD TRADE REV. 643, 647-48 (2015).
11.
Id. at 659.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. The Anthropocene
The Anthropocene in the context of international trade and
environmental law, and the legal regime surrounding climate change
in particular, can be best understood as arising as a product of
technologies used by Global North countries that enabled them to
12
exploit Global South countries. As Angela Harris writes,
[tlhe technologies associated with the Industrial Revolution and reliance on fossil
fuel energy over human and animal somatic energy gave colonizing nations an
edge over colonized nations, intensifying the socioeconomic inequalities between
them. Far from being over and done with, the economic, environmental, and
13
social effects of these global relations of domination continue today.

Thus, the current geological epoch finds itself intimately intertwined
with notions of environmental sustainability as well as economic
development, with exploitation and dominance on the one hand and a
perpetuation of poverty on the other.
Harris frames the relationship between humans and their
environment through the lens of vulnerability, arguing that "[a]
healthy adult human can only be considered separate from her
14
environment by willfully forgetting this interdependency." Using the
idea of vulnerability as a starting point, where humans and nature are
15
"now locked in an ever-tightening feedback loop," the limitations of
international agreements that fail to address this dynamic become
and
sustainability
writing about
Agyeman,
clear. Julian
(and
great
is
"[t]here
that
notes
environmental justice,
underresearched) potential for the notions of environmental justice,
human rights and sustainability to permeate environmental regimes
16
and international policy agreements." Crucially, Agyeman points out
that "sustainability as a policy approach can be understood as a more
exclusive, 'top-down' phenomenon. Paradoxically, however, the

Outside of the legal realm, anthropologists and other scholars offer helpful
12.
alternative framings of the Anthropocene. Donna Haraway in particular writes that
"[t]he Anthropocene marks severe discontinuities; what comes after will not be like what
came before. I think our job is to make the Anthropocene as short/thin as possible and to
cultivate with each other in every way imaginable epochs to come that can replenish
refuge."

DONNA J. HARAWAY, STAYING WITH THE TROUBLE: MAKING KIN IN THE

CHTHULUCENE 100 (2016). A lot can be learned from these more intersectional
approaches to understanding the epoch in which we live.
Angela P. Harris, Vulnerability and Power in the Age of the Anthropocene, 6
13.
WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV'T 98, 103 (2014).
Id. at 114.
14.
Id. at 127.
15.
Julian Agyeman, Robert D. Bullard & Bob Evans, Exploring the Nexus:
16.
Bringing Together Sustainability, Environmental Justice and Equity, 6 SPACE & POLITY
77, 86-87 (2002).
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implementation of sustainability is generally seen as being through
local action."1 7
While it is not within the scope of this Article to discuss how
sustainability can move from the local to the global, it is important to
bear this in mind throughout the discussion that follows concerning
the application of the WTO's multilateral framework to questions of
climate change. The approach posited herein is undoubtedly limited
and alone cannot provide all of the solutions to the systemic problems
created by humans in the Anthropocene. Throughout, vulnerability of
individuals and communities must be remembered, since they are the
ones primarily affected by climate change adaptation measures in
particular.18

B. The ParisAgreement
The negotiation of multilateral environmental agreements has
been challenging, in part due to the intersection of public and private
law in areas covered by environmental regulation,1 9 but also because
of differing concerns on the part of Global South and Global North
countries. In an area increasingly marked by regional or sectoral
agreements, the Paris Agreement stands in sharp contrast as a truly
global agreement, in the mold of the 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 20
The Paris Agreement was negotiated under the UNFCCC and is
the first major climate change agreement to include commitments from
both developed and developing countries. With a goal of keeping the
global temperature increase to "well below 2oC," 2 1 the Paris Agreement
recognizes the need for countries to take both climate change
adaptation and mitigation measures. 2 2 The binding obligations of the
agreement are focused on the conduct of the parties in pursuing
national measures and ensuring that they maintain contributions to
the climate change mitigation regime.2 3 The agreement does not

17.

Id. at 88.

18.
SUMUDu ATAPATTU, HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO CLIMATE CHANGE:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 143 (2016).

19.

Veerle Heyvaert, The Transnationalizationof Law: Rethinking Law through

Transnational Environmental Regulation, 6 TRANSNAT'L ENVTL. L. 205, 217 (2017)

("[T]he position of much of transnational environmental activity at the crossroads of
public and private law presents a taxing intellectual puzzle, although the challenges run
more deeply. This position calls into question the very usefulness of organizing the
discipline of law into demarcated public and private spheres.").
20.
See id. at 233.
21.
Paris Agreement, art. 2(1)(a), Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
22.
Id. arts. 4(2), 5(2), 7(1).
23.
Id. art. 4(2); Lavanya Rajamani, Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015
ParisAgreement: InterpretativePossibilitiesand Underlying Politics, 65 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 493, 497 (2016).
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require parties to actually meet these objectives, but merely requires
24
them to "aim" to achieve those goals.
The Paris Agreement does not define either climate change
mitigation or adaptation. The 2012 Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and
Climate Change Mitigation defines climate change mitigation as
"implementing policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
25
Mitigation measures include emissions trading
enhance sinks."
schemes, subsidies for renewable energy development, carbon taxes,
and domestic content requirements for renewable energy. Adaptation,
on the other hand, refers to "human-driven adjustments in ecological,
social or economic systems or policy processes, in response to actual or
26
Climate
expected climate stimuli and their effects or impacts."
(stockpiling),
change adaptation measures include food security
policies requiring use of certain water-resistant materials in
construction, and agricultural subsidies to switch to climate-adapted
27
crops.
In addition to adaptation and mitigation, there is a third category
of response to climate change, which is not addressed in the Paris
Agreement-climate engineering, or geoengineering, which "consists of
intentional, engineered measures to actively change the global climate
system and so reduce the realized climate changes that result from
28
elevated GHGs." Currently, there is no international legal regime to
29
control national climate engineering measures.
For purposes of this discussion, there are two particularly salient
points in relation to the Paris Agreement and how the WTO might
interact with national climate change measures undertaken to meet
the obligations set under the Paris Agreement:
First, in its preamble, the Paris Agreement explicitly recognizes
the need for differential treatment, in particular "the specific needs
and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially
those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate
change." 30 This goal is further enshrined in Article 2(2), which provides
that the Paris Agreement "will be implemented to reflect equity and
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and
national
light of different
the
in
capabilities,
respective

24.

Paris Agreement, supra note 21, art. 4(2); see Rajamani, supra note 23, at

498.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, RENEWABLE ENERGY
25.
SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 962 (Ottmar Edenhofer et al. eds., 2012).
Glossary of Key Terms, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
26.

https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NAPC/Pages/glossary.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2019)
[https://perma.ccfK2KW-FQ4T] (archived Mar. 22, 2019).
See generally U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
27.
TECHNOLOGIES FOR ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2006).

ON

CLIMATE

CHANGE,

Edward A. Parson, Climate Engineering in Global Climate Governance:
28.
Implications for Participationand Linkage, 3 TRANSNAT'L ENVTL. L. 89, 90 (2014).
Id. at 95.
29.
Paris Agreement, supra note 21, pmbl.
30.
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circumstances."3 1 This mirrors the S&DT provisions in the WTO
Agreements, which suggests a natural synergy between the WTO and
the Paris Agreement. 32
Second, the Paris Agreement, like the Kyoto Protocol,
unfortunately lacks enforcement mechanisms, which has been a focal
point of much of the criticism of the agreement.3 3 Without enforcement
capabilities, despite the best intentions of countries, possibilities of
success are more limited. The WTO has a robust dispute-settlement
system, despite current challenges to the system. In this respect, it is
well positioned to step in and make sure that the commitments by
countries under the Paris Agreement are properly adhered to, at least
to the extent that such measures are covered by existing or future WTO
rules. This is not to suggest that the WTO should be used as a vehicle
for imposing retaliatory measures, such as the suspension of
concessions, through the dispute-settlement process against member
states that fail to adhere to their commitments. Rather, the flexibilities
of the WTO system could be used by member states to lawfully
discriminate against such countries in their domestic regulations or to
support domestic industry in developing clean technology.
One of the biggest hurdles to achieving the targets set in the Paris
Agreement is the required capacity building. 34 Implementing the goals
of the Paris Agreement will require considerable capacity building on
the part of both developing and developed countries. Switching to clean
energy from traditional sources, such as coal, is costly and time
consuming. At the same time, it offers the prospect of a new sector of
employment, providing manufacturing jobs in renewable energy to
offset the loss of jobs in other sectors, including coal and steel.3 5
Particularly for countries of the Global South, achieving the necessary
capacity will be challenging. The Paris Agreement's provisions on
common but differentiated responsibilities, however, go beyond those
found in earlier multilateral environmental agreements, such as the
Montreal Protocol.3 6 Also key to the success of the Paris Agreement is

31.
Id. art. 2(2).
32.
See, e.g., World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, para. 44, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) (reaffirming that the
special and differential treatment provisions are an integral part of the WTO
agreements).
33.
See, e.g., Michael 0. Moore, Carbon Safeguard? Managing the Friction
Between Trade Rules and Climate Policy, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 43, 44 (2017).
34.
RALPH BODLE, LENA DONAT & MATTHIAS DUWE, UMWELT BUNDESAMT, THE
PARIS AGREEMENT: ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND OUTLOOK 20 (2016) [hereinafter
BODLE, DONAT & DUWEl.

35.
Chris Mooney, Study: Coal industry lost nearly 50,000 jobs in just five years,
WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.cominews/energyenvironment/wp/2015/04/0 1/the-decline-in-coal-jobs-in-one-chart/
?utmterm=.1ellbf652e0b [https://perma.cc/MMB3-3SVB] (archived Feb. 15, 2019).
36.
BODLE, DONAT & DUWE, supra note 34, at 25.
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a meaningful application of the principle of sustainable development
in a way that offers the Global South the opportunity to develop
economically.

III. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
In the area of trade and labor, the International Labor
Organization (ILO) is a long-standing international organization with
a plethora of rules, despite the lack of effectiveness of certain of these
rules and resistance by the trade community of the linkage between
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)IWTO and ILO
rules.3 7 There is no equivalent international institutional framework
to help address climate change in a unified fashion. Instead, much of
the discussion on climate change prior to the Paris Agreement arose in
the context of sustainable development. There is perhaps no concept
more fraught with tension in the context of trade law and the
environment than the notion of sustainable development. What
sustainable development means and for whose benefit it is to be
interpreted lie at the center of a debate between the Global South and
the Global North concerning industrialization, economic development,
and colonialist exploitation.
Sustainable development found some of its earliest concrete
articulation in the World Commission on Environment and
Development's 1987 report Our Common Future (also known as the
Brundtland Report). The report stated that
[s]ustainable global development requires that those who are more affluent
adopt life-styles within the planet's ecological means-in their use of energy, for
example. Further, rapidly growing populations can increase the pressure on
resources and slow any rise in living standards; thus sustainable development
can only be pursued if population size and growth are in harmony with the
38
changing productive potential of the ecosystem.

The report went on to note that sustainable development "is not a fixed
state of harmony, but rather a process of change in which the
exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation
of technological development, and institutional change are made
39
consistent with future as well as present needs."
There are other articulations of sustainable development. The
economist Herman Daly took a different approach to defining
sustainable development, finding that it "necessarily means a radical
shift from a growth economy and all it entails to a steady-state

See, e.g., Adelle Blackett, Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade
37.
Theory and Treaty Interpretation,31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1999).
38.

WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON

FUTURE para. 29 (1987).
Id. para. 30.
39.
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economy, certainly in the North, and eventually in the South as well." 40
Whether sustainable development is viewed through the lens of
population size and energy usage or through the perspective of
economic growth, there are some basic principles that underlie the
concept.
One common approach to understanding sustainable development
views it as having three pillars: social, environmental, and economic,
which must be used together to achieve real change. 4 ' Some scholars
have argued, however, that this structure is inherently unsustainable,
finding instead that the key foundation for sustainable development is
the ecological sustainability component, with social justice and
economic development playing secondary roles. 4 2 This perspective

recognizes that developing countries are to be treated differently as a
result of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
that threads throughout the multilateral environmental treaties. 4 3
The burden is on developed countries to ensure that their usage of
natural resources is sustainable.
For centuries, the Global South has experienced exploitation of its
resources by the countries of the Global North, who have used these
resources to drive their own economic growth. 44 Conservation
measures and efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions on the part of
Global North countries are at odds with the social and economic
development goals of the Global South.45 As Ruth Gordon has argued,
"[s]ustainable development appears to address what is essentially an
enigma without meaningfully challenging existing power structures or
the impact that the modern quest for a higher material standard of
living has had on the natural world." 4 6 The Global North continues to
consume the vast majority of global goods, resulting in "unsustainable
development" on the part of the Global North.4 7
Recent literature on international trade has grappled with the
concept of the "greening" of the WTO and industrial policy more

40.
41.

HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH 31 (1996).
Shawkat Alam, Natalie Klein & Juliette Overland, Achieving Social and

Environmental Justice Through the Many Dimensions of Globalisation:An Elusive or

Achievable Quest?, in GLOBALISATION AND THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 1, 3
(2011).

42.

See, e.g., Klaus Bosselmann, Sustainable Development and International

Environmental Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 667, 671 (2012).

43.
44.

Id. at 679.
Sumudu Atapattu & Carmen G. Gonzalez, The North-South Divide in

International Environmental Law: Framing the
Issues, in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 1, 6 (2015).
45.
Id. at 10.
46.
Ruth
Gordon,
Unsustainable Development,
in
INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH, supra note 44, at 50, 63.

47.

Id. at 68.
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48
generally in the context of sustainable development. This raises its
own concerns, for instance with respect to biofuels, on the part of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the Global South who have
49
expressed skepticism that this will benefit the Global South. As

Shawkat Alam has aptly put it,
[n]orthern countries have largely shaped the sustainable development agenda.
Because the North has already achieved an acceptable standard of living and
has, historically, been the site of large-scale pollution, sustainable development
has taken on a green hue. Meanwhile, the South is set to become the next area
of global economic growth and population expansion, while remaining highly
vulnerable to anthropogenic climate change. The need to re-invigorate the
concept of sustainable development is a pressing concern.

50

In the midst of this discussion, positioning the WTO to be a leader
in thoughtful reinvigoration of the sustainable development discourse
seems not only beneficial but also both possible and necessary for the
future of the international trading regime, particularly given the
framing of the WTO Agreement and WTO jurisprudence surrounding

Article XX of the GATT.
A. Preamble to the GATT and the Agreement Establishingthe WTO
The preamble to the GATT famously establishes the social welfare
principles that underpin trade liberalization-"raising standards of
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily volume of
real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the
resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of
goods."5 1 The preamble to the WTO Agreement builds on this, speaking
of the objective of sustainable development, seeking to protect and

See generally, e.g., Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, Clash of Rationalities:Revisiting the
48.
Trade and Environmental Debate in Light of WTO Disputes over Green IndustrialPolicy,
6 TRADE L. & DEV. 177 (2014); Aaron Cosbey & Petros C. Mavroidis, A Turquoise Mess:
Green Subsidies, Blue IndustrialPolicy and Renewable Energy: The Case for Redrafting
the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO, 17 J. INT'L ECON. L. 11 (2014); Susanne Droege et
al., The Trade System and Climate Action: Ways Forward under the ParisAgreement, 13
S.C. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 195, (2017); Gregory Messenger, Sustainable Development and the
Commodities Challenge: The Eventual 'Greening'of the World Trade Organization?,9
TRADE L. & DEV. 54 (2017); Martin Khor, Preliminary Notes on the Green Economy, in
the Context of Sustainable Development, Inter-Sessional Session on Rio Plus 20 (Jan.
10, 2010), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/
18725southcentre.pdf [https://perma.cclM63D-78MD] (archived Feb. 17, 2019).
Chidi Oguamanam, Sustainable Development in the Era of Bioenergy and
49.
Agricultural Land Grab, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL

SOUTH, supra note 44, at 237-39.
Shawkat Alam, Trade and the Environment: Perspectives from the Global
50.
South, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH, supranote 44,

at 297-98.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S.
51.
154, 61 Stat. A-11 [hereinafter GATT].
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preserve the environment. 52 It also recognizes the need for developing
countries to share in the growth in international trade. These goals,
together with the social welfare promises originally enshrined in the
preamble to the GATT, are at the center of the success of the
international trading system, and despite subsequent failure to give
substantive effect to some of these goals, offer hope for its future.
The preamble of the WTO Agreement provides support for the
premise that not only does the scope of the WTO extend to
environmental protection, but also that environmental protection is
actually a key goal of the WTO and part of its core mission. In practice,
however, what is meant by sustainable development in the context of
the WTO has been a sticking point between Global North and Global
South countries. Furthermore, the weight to be accorded to the
preambular language is limited. In the aftermath of the 1999 Seattle
Ministerial Conference, Mark Halle wrote that it was clear that
the WTO's commitment to sustainable development remains almost wholly
theoretical. A dedication to the notion is carried in the preamble to the
agreements closing out the Uruguay Round, but preambular language in a
binding and enforceable legal agreement carries no more weight than such
language would in a contract setting out the terms of a merger between two giant

corporations. What counts is what is enforceable. The rest is for public
consumption. 5 3

As many scholars have observed, while promoting sustainable
development and ensuring that developing countries obtain a fair
share of global trade growth are part of the main objectives of the WTO,
in practice the development aspect has often been ignored at the
expense of the Global South countries. 54 This has resulted in conflict
dating back to the GATT days between the Global South and the Global
North on environmental priorities, with many Global South

52.
WTO Agreement, supra note 9, pmbl. The preamble reads in relevant part:
"Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be
conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a
large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding
the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of
the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development,
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for

doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different
levels of economic development."
53.
MARK HALLE, INTL INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., SEATTLE AND SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT 6 (2000), https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/
seattleandsd.pdf [https://perma.cclK72G-UXNJ] (archived Feb. 15, 2019). The WTO's
preambular language has been described by other scholars as "essentially hollow." Adil
Najam & Nick Robins, Seizing the Future: The South, Sustainable Development and
InternationalTrade, 77 INT'L AFF. 49, 50 (2001).
54.
See, e.g., Martin Khor & Jos6 Antonio Ocampo, The Global Trade Architecture
and the Developing World 3 (June 2009) (unpublished working paper) (on file with
Initiative for Policy Dialogue Working Paper Series).
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contracting parties of the GATT viewing efforts by the Global North to
curb emissions and conserve resources as paternalistic and
55
hypocritical.
More recently, near-global recognition of the perils of climate
change has led to something of a shift in the orientation of the WTO
from a traditional trade perspective to a growing awareness that
sustainable development must be given teeth as a real objective of the
organization, particularly with respect to the 2030 United Nations
56
As Gregory Messenger argues,
Sustainable Development Goals.
as a body concerned with
identified
customarily
"is
while the WTO
most notable for its
is
which
barriers,
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tariff and
system and formally
settlement
dispute
comparatively effective
the WTO has
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arm,"
negotiating
egalitarian (if deadlocked)
of developed
network
its
"through
success
had some of its greatest
dispute
informal
and
creators
soft-law
Committees functioning as
to
transparency
institutional
on
relied
has
settlement forums," which
57
be effective.
While these initiatives indicate some shift in the WTO's approach
to sustainable development, they do not fully address the conflict
between how the Global South and the Global North view sustainable
development. Fundamentally, the main beneficiaries of the neoliberal
trading order have been multinational corporations that have been
able to operate in the unregulated spaces created by international
trade and investment rules that restrict the ability of states to regulate
their own economies. 58 These corporations have exploited countries of
the Global South for resources, shifting the pollution burden to places
that do not benefit from the end products of the corporations. This
neocolonial resource exploitation combined with efforts by Global
North countries to require all countries to curb emissions has been
viewed with skepticism by Global South countries, who see such efforts
as a means of perpetuating Global South poverty by limiting their
59
access to industrial technologies.
How then should one accord weight to the language in the WTO
Agreement preamble in a way that accounts for the concerns of the
Global South? The WTO's Committee on Trade and Development
already considers development issues and, together with the
Committee on Trade and the Environment, could be tasked with
providing an ongoing evaluation of sustainable development in the

DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE
55.
FUTURE 185 (1994).
Messenger, supra note 48, at 56.
56.
Id. at 83.
57.
Environmental Justice and International
Gonzalez,
G.
Carmen
58.
Environmental Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, supra note 42, at 77, 83.

59.

Id. at 89.
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context of trade and climate change. 60 Full transparency with respect
to reports or other documents prepared by these committees would be
a necessary step in providing local constituents with clarity regarding
the WTO's position on this matter. The WTO has already made
significant progress both in transparency and in giving serious
consideration to developing country issues; however, more progress is
always possible. Much of the WTO's focus has been on the
infrastructural and supply-side issues faced by developing countries.
Take the 2017 joint report from the WTO Committee on Trade and
Development and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development on the Aid for Trade project, for instance, which
particularly addresses the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development. 6 ' Much of the focus on sustainable development in that
report involves improving physical as well as digital connectivity. 62
While there is no question that trade facilitation and digital
infrastructure are important components to improving trade with the
Global South, sustainable development is a concept that must
encompass more than just trade, even as understood within the WTO's
institutional framework. After all, the main beneficiaries of improved
digital and physical infrastructure are Global North countries whose
industries and individuals consume the resources and products of the

Global South.
Fossil fuel subsidies are an area where the goals of sustainable
development and the rules of the international trading regime can
successfully operate in harmony. In the December 2017 WTO
Ministerial Conference, twelve WTO members issued a declaration on
fossil fuel subsidy reform, calling for the phasing out of fossil fuel
subsidies. 63 According to the statement, fossil fuel subsidies were
estimated at USD $425 billion in 2015, and phasing them out would
not only significantly reduce emissions but would also constitute
progress toward sustainable development. 64 The challenge rests in the
limitations inherent in the WTO's Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SCM) Agreement, which only address subsidies that distort
trade and consequently affect competition.6 5 Without incentives to

60.
WTO Committee on Trade and Development, Decisions by the General
Council on 31 January 1995, WTO Doc. WT/L/46 (Feb. 23, 1995).
61.
World Trade Org. & Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Aid for Trade at a
Glance 2017: Promoting Trade, Inclusiveness and Connectivity for Sustainable
Development 23 (2017).

62.
Id.
63.
World Trade Organization, Fossil Fuel Subsidies Reform Ministerial
Statement, 12 December 2017, WT/MIN(17)/54. The twelve countries behind this
statement are Chile, Costa Rica, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Moldova, New Zealand,
Norway, Samoa, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Uruguay.
64.
Id.
65.
INT'L CTR. TRADE SUSTAINABLE
THROUGH THE TRADE SYSTEM 3 (2018).
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phase such subsidies out, countries are unlikely to do so sua sponte,
being instead more likely to focus on capacity building and technical
assistance initiatives that again, push the onus for change onto the
Global South countries, who continue to be minor participants in the
fossil fuel subsidy regime.
Sustainable development as presented in this Article is primarily
an environmental concept, and does not operate in isolation. Within
the WTO framework, sustainable development in the preamble of the
WTO Agreement must be read together with the Article XX exceptions
that may apply to environmental trade rules and policies.
B. Article XX and the Environment
The environment is mentioned elsewhere in the WTO agreements
besides the preambles to the GATT and the WTO Agreement. That the
WTO is meant to extend to environmental measures is clear from the
interpretation of Article XX(g) in the post-GATT era. Article XX(g) of
the GATT allows for member states to pass measures "relating to the
66
conservation of exhaustible natural resources." In the early WTO
case United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, the panel found that clean air was an exhaustible natural
resource, opening the door to an interpretation of "exhaustible" that
67
included matters relating to environmental conservation. Also in
relation to Article XX(g), the Appellate Body in United States-Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products famously found
that it allowed for member states to pass measures to protect the
failed
environment (even though in that case, the measure in question
68
XX).
Article
of
chapeau
the
under
to meet the requirements
Article XX(b) also offers a strong basis for environmental
protection and may permit measures designed to promote sustainable
development, providing as it does for measures that are "necessary to
69
The panel and
protect human, animal or plant life or health."
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GATT, supra note 51, art. XX(g).
66.
Panel Report, United States-Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional
67.
Gasoline, para. 6.37, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996).
Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp
68.
and Shrimp Products, para. 185-86, WTO Doc. WTfDS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
GATT, supra note 51, art. XX(b).
69.
Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
70.
Tyres, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007); Panel Report, Brazil-Measures
Affecting Imports of Retreated Tyres, TT 7.87-7.100, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/R (June 12,
2007).
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The Appellate Body in European Communities-Measures
Prohibitingthe Importation and Marketing of Seal Products endorsed
an approach of animal protection on the basis of Article XX(a) and its
objective of allowing the adoption of measures that are necessary to
protect public morals. 7 ' In so doing, the WTO has helped to advance
international animal law and global norms relating to animals. 72 This
offers some hope that Article XX(a) could provide another avenue for
countries that wish to pass environmental regulations that might
otherwise violate WTO rules-for instance, rules restricting the
production and importation of products with a certain nondegradable
plastic content. Such restrictions could possibly be justified under a
public morals argument, given the long-term environmental impact of
nondegradable plastic on wildlife.
Article XX, it must be remembered, only applies to goods. The
analogous General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provision,
Article XIV, also provides potential justifications for environmental
measures, particularly through XIV(a) and XIV(b), the analogous
subsections on public morals and the protection of human, animal, or
plant life or health.7 3 The environmental focus of the WTO established
in the preamble goes beyond Article XX of the GATT and Article XIV
of the GATS, however, and permeates all of the agreements. As
preambular language, it provides the first line of justification for using
the WTO, both as a rule-making organization and as a disputesettlement body, in helping to ensure effective implementation of
climate change mitigation and adaptation measures by WTO members.

IV.

EXCEPTIONS AND WAIVERS

Despite the preamble of the WTO Agreement and the GATT and
GATS exceptions, which allow for environmental measures that violate
WTO rules to be taken, in the clean and renewable energy sectors the
WTO, as a line of cases demonstrates, has not been favorable to
domestic measures. 74 While the merits of each of those cases can be
debated, it is clear that future climate change measures taken by

71.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶¶ 5.194-5.201, WTO Doc.
WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R (May 22, 2014).
72.
Katie Sykes, Globalization and the Animal Turn: How InternationalTrade
Law Contributesto Global Norms of Animal Protection, 5 TRANSNAT'L ENVTL. L. 55, 57

(2016).
73.
General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. 14, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.
183, 33 ILM 1167 [hereinafter GATS].
74.
Christian Haberli, WTO Rules Can Prevent Climate Change Mitigation for
Agriculture, Society of InternationalEconomic Law 11 (World Trade Institute, Working
Paper No. 2016/06). These cases range from India-Solar Cells to Canada-Feed-in
TariffProgram.
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countries to meet their self-imposed targets under the Paris Agreement
are likely to run afoul of WTO rules. Countries will want to incentivize
private-sector action through prohibited means, including subsidies
and domestic content requirements. This is already evident from the
cases the WTO has heard, whether on renewable energy or on
biofuels.7 5
Sustainable development goals that actually benefit countries of
the Global South may require certain types of industrial policy to be
effective. 76 Even in the Global North, policies that encourage local
investment into renewable and clean energy may be required to
achieve the climate change mitigation and adaptation goals of the
Paris Agreement. This is likely to give rise to problems within the WTO
system. As Sadeq Bigdeli writes,
[t]oday, most of the dominant trade legal discourses do not draw a line between
"protectionism" and "industrial policy." Many, if not most, trade lawyers consider
protectionism to include any domestic regulation intended to promote national
industry at the expense of foreign competition, regardless of its potential
merits.

77

Bigdeli argues that as the benefits of a green industrial policy become
more evident, "it is most reasonable to accommodate a green industrial
78
'policy space' as part of country's 'right to regulate."' While Bigdeli
suggests that there might be some possibility for justification of such
policies under the auspices of Article XX(b) (based on the Appellate
79
certain forms of
Body's finding in Brazil-Retreaded Tyres),
industrial policy may violate WTO rules, even if a broad interpretation
of Article XX(b) is applied.
Subsidies are at the center of many discussions on industrial
policy and the green economy. Robert Howse has proposed reviving the
concept of nonactionable subsidies as a means of enabling climate0
8
change subsidies within the framework of the SCM Agreement.
Aaron Cosbey and Petros Mavroidis, in writing about green subsidies
and renewable energy, have made the case for redrafting the WTO
SCM Agreement so as to permit subsidies as instruments of industrial
policy. 8 ' Their justification, similar to Bigdeli's, focuses on the idea
that industrial policy in the area of renewable energy would be
beneficial, with climate change-related measures creating "global
public goods." 8 2 They argue against the use of exceptions to trade rules
in these situations, since this would result in "not so much a slippery

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Droege, supra note 48, at 221-23.
Bigdeli, supranote 48, at 182-83.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 203.

See ROBERT HOWSE, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., CLIMATE MITIGATION
80.
SUBSIDIES AND THE WTO LEGAL FRAMEWORK: A POLICY ANALYSIS 20 (2010).

81.
82.

Cosbey & Mayroidis, supra note 48, at 1.
Id. at 30.

2019]

USING THE WTO TO FACILITATE THE PARIS A GREEMENT

563

slope as a sudden cliff," given the political popularity of protectionist
measures.8 3 While their argument is largely convincing, particularly
given the widespread critique of the WTO's subsidies rules by
economists and trade lawyers alike, there is still room for the
application of exceptions and waivers in addressing questions of
climate change within the WTO structure.
In certain rare cases, it may be possible that the existing rules of
the WTO Agreement are inadequate in allowing for national measures
required to protect a sensitive area of national concern. In "exceptional
circumstances," Article IX of the WTO Agreement authorizes the WTO
Ministerial Conference to waive an obligation imposed on a member
under any of the WTO agreements, effectively carving out a space
outside of the WTO rules. 84 This language mirrors that of Article
XXV(5) of the GATT, which similarly allows parties "in exceptional
circumstances" to waive obligations imposed on certain parties.8 5
Waivers have most frequently been used with respect to special
and differential treatment. The 1979 Enabling Clause is an example of
one such exception under Article XXV(5) of the GATT.86 The Enabling
Clause, which remains in force, allows derogations from most favored
nation treatment to be applied by developed countries toward
developing countries.87 Similarly, the WTO General Council approved
a waiver in 1999 allowing the grant of preferential tariff treatment to
products from least developed countries.8 8 A 2011 waiver further
allows WTO members to provide preferential treatment to services and
service suppliers from least developed countries. 8 9 All of these waivers
permit derogations from most favored nation treatment to favor
developing or least developed countries.
More recently, in 2014, India temporarily vetoed the newly
negotiated Trade Facilitation Agreement over lack of assurances
concerning its food stockholding program.9 0 Concerned that the WTO's
Agreement on Agriculture would prohibit measures needed to protect
food security, India had pushed for an exception expressly permitting

83.
84.
85.

Id. at 33.
WTO Agreement, supra note 9, art. IX(3).
GATT, supra note 51, art. XXV(5). For a detailed study of WTO waivers, see

generally ISABEL FEICHTNER, THE LAW AND POLITICS OF WTO WAIVERS: STABILITY AND
FLEXIBILITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw (2012).

86.
Differential and More Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT BISD [hereinafter
Enabling Clause].
87.

Id.

88.
WTO General Council, Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least-Developed
Countries, WTO Doc. WT[L/304 (June 17, 1999).
89.
WTO General Council, Preferential Treatment to Services and Service
Suppliers of Least-Developed Countries,WTO Doc. WT[L/847 (Dec. 17, 2011).
90.
Eliason, supra note 10, at 643-44.
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food stockholding.9 1 The WTO members came to a temporary
agreement in December 2013, permitting a public stockholding
92
which was amended and
exemption for food security purposes,
can be reached.9 3
solution
permanent
a
until
extended in 2014
It is important to reiterate that this type of exception to WTO
commitments is very rare. Within a system built on rules and
exceptions, these are effectively the exceptions to those exceptions. The
Appellate Body, in interpreting the Lom6 Waiver in European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, found that although there has been little guidance on the
interpretation of waivers, the language of the GATT and the WTO
Agreement on waivers "stress[es] the exceptional nature of waivers
and subject waivers to strict disciplines," finding that they "should be
94
interpreted with great care." Nevertheless, a handful of waivers are
granted each year, indicating that they are less infrequent than they
might first appear.9 5 Consensus is generally required for a waiver to
be adopted, however if consensus cannot be reached or if a member
96
requests a vote, voting will take place. John Jackson, writing about
waivers in the GATT, suggested that there is a fine line between "new
new
obligations that are conditions to exceptions to GATT and general
97
This
amendment."
through
only
imposed
obligations that ought to be
applies equally to waivers under the WTO Agreement and must be
taken into account when suggesting waivers as policy instruments. In
his treatise, Jackson described waivers as "[p]erhaps the most
98
important single power" of the GATT contracting parties. Arguably,
and particularly in the context of climate change, this is still true with
respect to the WTO members.
Waivers offer considerable flexibility for countries to remain a
part of the WTO while being exempted from adherence to certain WTO
rules. Given the historical usage of waivers under both the GATT and
the WTO in relation to developing countries, expanding the use of
waivers to climate change mitigation or adaptation efforts by countries
of the Global South seems logical. Where special and differential
treatment measures are insufficient to allow countries to take the
CUTS INT'L: GENEVA, PUBLIC STOCKHOLDING FOR FOOD SECURITY: OPTIONS
91.
FOR SMALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND LDCS TOWARDS A PERMANENT SOLUTION 4
(2017).
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision, Public Stockholding for Food
92.
Security Purposes, WTO Doc. WT/MIND(13)/38, WT/L/913 (Dec. 7, 2013).
WTO General Council, PublicStockholding for Food Security Purposes, Draft
93.
Decisions, WT/GC/W/688 (Nov. 24, 2014).
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regimefor the Importation,
94.
Sale and Distributionof Bananas, ¶ 185 WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
See, e.g., WORLD TRADE ORG., ANNUAL REPORT 2017 at 47-48.
95.
Isabel Feichtner, The Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the WTO for
96.
Political Debate, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 615, 621 (2009) (noting that certain waivers are
granted to individual members, while others are in the form of collective waivers, which
"suspend obligations for (potentially) all or groups of members").
97.

JOHN JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT 139 (1969).

98.

Id. at 541.
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measures necessary to mitigate climate change, the best approach
would be for the WTO Ministerial Conference to adopt one or more
carefully drafted and limited exceptions from the WTO rules. The
public stockholding exception on food security was motivated in part
by concerns on the part of developing countries arising from climate
change-related weather events that threaten crops.9 9 Similar
exceptions could arise to allow for particular types of otherwise
actionable or prohibited subsidies or domestic content measures to
encourage domestic economic development of the clean energy sector.
Other exceptions might arise in relation to carbon adjustment
measures that fall afoul of WTO rules.1 00
Waivers need not only apply to Global South countries; however,
the overzealous use of exceptions has the potential to undermine the
effectiveness of the WTO's rules-based regime. Any climate changerelated waiver would require sunset provisions to ensure that the
waivers would expire once climate change mitigation or adaptation
targets were met, or once a specified period of time elapsed. In this
discussion, it is also worth querying if a different standard should
apply to mitigation as opposed to adaptation. Adaptation measures
pose additional challenges to the Global South countries, who are at
once the most vulnerable to climate change geographically and who
also face the greatest capacity-building and infrastructural challenges
in financing expensive adaptation measures.1 0 1 While it could be
argued that there is more room to carve out exceptions in relation to
the implementation of mitigation measures than in relation to
adaptation measures, since mitigation has an impact on every country
and every individual, adaptation measures must receive equal
attention to ensure that the previously discussed goals of sustainable
development are met in a way that does not overly burden countries of
the Global South.

99.
RAUL MONTEMAYOR, INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEv., PUBLIC
STOCKHOLDING FOR FOOD SECURITY PURPOSES: SCENARIOS AND OPTIONS FOR A
PERMANENT SOLUTION 37 (2014).
100. JAMES BACCHUS, CTR. FOR INT'L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, THE CASE FOR A

WTO CLIMATE WAIVER 20 (2017). For an overview of the legality of various measures to
combat climate change, see Robert Howse & Antonia Eliason, Domestic and
International Strategies to Address Climate Change: An Overview of the WTO Legal
Issues, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION AND THE MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE
48-93 (2009).
101. See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK OCTOBER 2017
at 117-83 (2017). See generally M. Monirul Qader Mirza, Climate Change and Extreme
Weather Events: Can Developing CountriesAdapt?, 3 CLIMATE POL'Y 233 (2003).
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V. SPECIAL & DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT

The final layer of support found in the WTO for addressing
national climate change measures is the special and differential
treatment (S&DT) provisions found across the WTO Agreements. Since
the inception of the GATT in 1947, treatment for developing countries
10 2
During the early GATT years, this
has developed significantly.
included a combination of ad hoc measures, as well as GATT Article
XVIII concerning governmental assistance for economic development,
in particular balance of payment measures, and GATT Article XXXVII,
which explicitly addressed the need for developed countries to reduce
03
or eliminate trade barriers to products from developing countries.
The 1979 Enabling Clause gave permanent legal protection to the
Generalized System of Preferences, an exception to the GATT rules
that allowed special treatment to be afforded to developing countries
04
and least developed countries by participating developed countries.1
With the establishment of the WTO in 1995, S&DT provisions became
formalized into the various agreements in the WTO. Most of these
provisions were relatively limited, allowing developing countries
extended phase-in periods for new obligations, such as Article 66 of the
105
They also provided for provisions of technical
TRIPS Agreement.
assistance (Article 67 of TRIPS) and for restrictions of trade in services
106
for balance-of-payment difficulties (GATS Article XII).
These are the traditional S&DT provisions in the WTO. The recent
Trade Facilitation Agreement contains novel S&DT provisions that
expand significantly upon the more traditional and limited provisions.
Rather than include such provisions as an afterthought to the main
agreement, merely providing for some extended timeframes for
implementation, Section II of the TFA provides a series of rules on
S&DT. These include measures relating to capacity building, centered
around partnerships between developed and developing countries. The
rules also include conditional obligations, the timeframe for
implementation of which depends on the self-designation by the
developing countries of the provisions that fall under each of the
10 7
categories laid out in the agreement.
Trade facilitation measures, which center on customs and border
administration, are often costly to implement, requiring a level of

102. Alexander Keck & Patrick Low, Special and Differential Treatment in the
WTO: Why, When and How? 1-7 (WTO: Econ. Research & Statistics Div., Staff Working
Paper ERSD-2004-03, 2004).
103. GATT, supra note 51, arts. XVIII, XXXVII.
104. Keck & Low, supra note 102.
105. Id. at 7.
106. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art.
67, Jan. 1995, 2017, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter TRIPS]; GATS, supra note 73,
art. XII.
107. For an overview of the TFA and its S&DT provisions, see Eliason, supra note
10, at 659-62.
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technological capacity that developing countries may struggle to
achieve, particularly where other, more pressing, infrastructural and
developmental challenges exist.10 8 The benefits to implementing these
trade facilitation measures accrue to developed as well as developing
countries, making the capacity-building arrangements in the TFA
particularly apt in the context of climate change, since developed
countries are providing support to developing countries to meet the
obligations.1 0 9 By supporting developing countries in meeting the goals
of the TFA through capacity building, developed countries benefit from
reduced cost and improved access to the developing country markets.
Consumers in developed countries stand to benefit from trade
facilitation measures that reduce the cost of goods imported from
developing countries.
Climate change measures are not dissimilar. Climate adaptation
and mitigation measures are disproportionately costly and difficult for
developing countries to implement. 11 0 Even for Global North countries,
such initiatives require considerable infrastructural investment. As
with trade facilitation measures, it is the developed as well as the
developing countries that benefit from climate mitigation measures
taken by other countries. In fact, with climate change mitigation
measures, every country in the world benefits from each individual
measure taken by each country. Combating climate change is a global
challenge that requires global participation.
While S&DT measures can exist in the form of waivers, building
such measures into multilateral or plurilateral agreements gives them
greater legitimacy, as permanent, negotiated provisions that form part
of the WTO's key legal texts. Contemplating how such measures might
work in the context of a potential climate change-related agreement is
necessary to completing the three-pronged approach to facilitating the
Paris Agreement through the framework of the WTO.
A. A Trade and Climate ChangeAgreement
The Paris Agreement is based on a bottom-up structure, wherein
countries have the flexibility to determine their own targets. The
S&DT provisions of the TFA have similar flexibilities, suggesting that
such provisions might offer a means of using the WTO's dispute-

108. Id. at 658.
109. Id. at 660.
110. Climate Change is Driving Debt for Developing Countries, U.N. FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (July 3, 2018), https://unfccc.int/news/climatechange-is-driving-debt-for-developing-countries
fhttps://perma.cc/4GDN-SCFG]
(archived Feb. 24, 2019); Megan Rowling, How much will climate change cost developing
nations?, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Nov. 26, 2015) https://www.weforum.org/agenda/
2015/11/how-much-will-climate-change-cost-developing-nations/ [https://perma.cc/
AA5A-24QY] (archived Feb. 24, 2019).
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settlement system as a way of enforcing obligations under the Paris
Agreement. The challenge here rests in finding a way to apply special
and differential treatment measures like those in the TFA to climate
change-related measures.
Much as the WTO already works in tandem with WIPO in relation
and with the World Customs Organization in relation to the
TRIPS
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of a common set of rules, although a targeted agreement that directly
aims to facilitate the Paris Agreement would be more effective.112
Failure to date to reach agreement on the EGA highlights some of the
problems that are likely to arise in any climate change-related trade
negotiations. The negotiation of the EGA began in July 2014, with a
goal of promoting trade with respect to certain environmental
products, including wind turbines and solar panels as well as energy
3
saving products.11 With seventeen countries and the EU taking part
in negotiations, the failure to reach agreement in December 2016 and
subsequent end to negotiations were due in part to disagreement
1
concerning what constituted environmental goods. 14 Environmental
goods lack a universally agreed-upon definition, which poses
5
challenges, as their categorization can become politically fraught."
With any climate change and trade agreement, balancing political
tensions with environmental goals will be the greatest challenge to
negotiators.

111. Eliason, supra note 10, at 648.
112. Droege, supra note 48, at 205.
Goods
113. Report from the 141h round of negotiations for an Environmental
6
2
/July/
01
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2016),
8,
(July
(EGA)
Agreement
tradoc_154784.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PPS-8E8V] (archived Feb. 24, 2019) [hereinafter
EGA Report].
114. Ministerial Talks to Clinch Environmental Goods Agreement Hit Stumbling
2016),
8,
(Dec.
DEV.
& SUSTAINABLE
INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE
Block,
https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/ministerial-talks-to-clinchenvironmental-goods-agreement-hit-stumbling [https://perma.cc/MJS3-6QR3] (archived
Mar. 22, 2019).
115. See id. (stating that bicycles and their categorization became a particular area
of difficulty during the December 2016 Environmental Goods Agreement negotiations,
with the EU resisting China's efforts to have bicycles classified as environmental goods).
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One aspect of the EGA that could provide guidance for a
plurilateral agreement designed to facilitate the Paris Agreement is
the planned extension of most favored nation treatment under the
agreement to all WTO members and not just those participating in the
agreement. 116 This approach, which the EGA negotiations viewed as
being conditional on the EGA members representing a "critical mass of
global trade in environmental goods," would result in a de facto
multilateralization of reduced or zero tariffs on environmental goods,
thus facilitating the adoption of clean technologies and encouraging
climate mitigation actions)' 7
How, then, might a plurilateral WTO agreement on trade and
climate change be structured so as to maximize the ability of countries
to meet the targets set in the Paris Agreement? Taking the TFA as a
model, some of the preambular language offers guidance for how the
priorities of a trade and climate change agreement might be laid out.
The TFA highlights developing country needs and capacity building as
well as the need for effective cooperation on trade facilitation and
customs compliance issues in its preamble. 11 8 With climate change, the,
developing country needs and capacity-building requirements are just
as important, if not more so, than with trade facilitation. Furthermore,
cooperation is crucial to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement,
since, as previously discussed, climate change cannot be effectively
addressed in any fashion other than globally.
The S&DT provisions of the TFA can largely be exported to a trade
and climate change agreement. Developing countries should be able to
self-designate provisions that they can implement soonest, those that
they require additional time to implement, and those that require
assistance and capacity-building support from developed countries.1 1 9
The TFA recognizes that least developed country members require
additional support, providing that they "will only be required to
undertake commitments to the extent consistent with their individual
development, financial and trade needs or their administrative and
institutional capabilities."1 20 It is important to understand that even
in the context of climate change, mitigation and adaptation efforts

116. EGA Report, supra note 113.
117. Id.
118. General Council, Protocol Amending the MarrakeshAgreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, WTO Doc. WT/L/940 (Nov. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Trade
Facility Agreement]. The preamble states, in part: "Recognizing the particular needs of
developing and especially least-developed country Members and desiring to enhance
assistance and support for capacity building in this area; Recognizing the need for
effective cooperation among Members on trade facilitation and customs compliance
issues." Id. pmbl.
119. Id. art. 14 (setting out Categories A, B, and C for developing country Members
or LDC Members to designate each of the TFA's general provisions as Category C are
the measures that will require the most time and capacity building help to implement).
120. Id. art. 13(3).
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cannot be forced upon Global South countries, since that would in effect
serve to impose costs upon those countries that are largely a result of
Global North countries exploiting the planet's resources for their
economic gain.
Nevertheless, there is an immediacy to the climate change crisis
that requires quick action. A trade and climate change agreement
would need to go beyond the commitments in the TFA by developed
countries to assist with capacity building. It would also need to extract
recognition on the part of the Global North countries that, as they are
to a much larger degree responsible for the environmental destruction
that has given rise to climate change, they will be required to commit
to building capacity in the Global South to enact climate change
mitigation and adaptation measures. Even though such an admission
of responsibility might be difficult to negotiate, having firm obligations
regarding how cooperative capacity building will operate that
strengthen the soft law language in Article 21 of the TFA might serve
21
as an acceptable middle ground.1
The TFA created a Committee on Trade Facilitation to help
122
Similarly, a
oversee assistance and support for capacity building.
committee on trade and climate change would need to be created in
relation to a potential trade and climate change agreement, since the
existing Committee on Trade and Environment and Committee on
Trade and Development already have significant agendas. It would be
important for a committee on trade and climate change to liaise
regularly with the UNFCCC in relation to the Paris Agreement
targets.
A detailed discussion of what substantive provisions a trade and
climate change agreement would contain is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, it is clear that it would need to go beyond the
envisioned scope of the EGA, which is largely a tariff classification and
reduction exercise. Including services and intellectual property along
with goods in the trade and climate change agreement would be
necessary to provide the broadest support for facilitating the Paris
Agreement. If a multilateral agreement were possible, a concurrent
amendment of the SCM Agreement would be particularly beneficial to
allow for greater domestic industry support.

121. Id. art. 21. The TFA provides for assistance and support for capacity building,
noting that donor Members "agree to facilitate the provision" of such support "on
mutually agreed terms either bilaterally or through the appropriate international
organizations." In laying out the principles for assistance and support for capacity
building, the TFA states that "[m]embers shall endeavor to apply" these principles. Id.
The capacity building language as written can thus be viewed, at least in part, as soft
law obligations.
122. Id. art. 23.
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VI. CHALLENGES TO THIS APPROACH

There are three major challenges to using the WTO to help
facilitate the implementation of the Paris Agreement that must be
addressed.
First, there is the political challenge. With the United States
currently refusing to participate in the international system and
withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, does this foreclose a
multilateral approach? Unless a carrot-and-stick approach is available
such that there is something in it for the United States to bring them
on board, making any progress in a multilateral institution like the
WTO seems unlikely. Combined with the United States' negative
approach to the Appellate Body, this could be detrimental to the
multilateral future of the WTO. Unfortunately, climate change will not
wait until a more reasonable US administration comes into power, and
as such, progress must be attempted even where a certain degree of
optimism and faith in the strength of multilateralism is required. Even
if a multilateral approach were to fail, a plurilateral agreement could
offer a means of overcoming the reluctance of the United States to play
ball internationally.
The second challenge relates more broadly to the worldwide
backlash against globalization. An obvious question is whether this is
the moment to use the WTO to accomplish even more than is already
set out in its agreements. When so many countries seem to be moving
away from the WTO toward regionalism, 123 perhaps this is an
inopportune time to look to expanding the WTO's capabilities.
Nevertheless, the alternative would be to do nothing, seeing as
creating a new multilateral enforcement body specifically designed to
address climate change measures seems far less likely to succeed than
does leveraging the existing structures of the WTO. While the WTO is
a neoliberal institution that is inherently problematic and that has at
times served to uphold entrenched power structures in the Global
North to the detriment of the Global South, it has recently taken a
more proactive role in addressing development and environmental
issues. 124 With Global South countries increasingly vocal in the WTO,
there is hope for at least some degree of reform to the international
trading system.
Finally, WTO rules may make it difficult to allow for climate
change mitigation measures to be taken in some situations, for
instance in relation to agriculture.1 25 Many agricultural support

123. Antonia Eliason, Development and Regional Trade Agreements: Entrenching
Structural Inequities, 46 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 635, 635 (2018) [hereinafter Eliason
Development].
124. Id. at 647.
125. Hiberli, supra note 74.
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mechanisms designed to encourage green agriculture could constitute
violations of WTO rules, whether through trade restrictions that
or
conflict with national treatment obligations under GATT Article III
126
In
Agreement.
subsidies that constitute violations of the SCM
particular, the ability to differentiate between locally grown and
imported products may run afoul of WTO rules despite offering a
simple and effective mechanism to support green agriculture. This
Article would argue that, precisely for the reason that WTO rules may
make taking climate mitigation measures more challenging, it is
important to think through the use of the WTO and make it a vehicle
for positive change rather than an obstacle for implementation of
climate change. Waivers, as previously discussed, can be used to create
exceptions to the rules that prevent climate change mitigation
measures from being taken. Renegotiating agreements, while not
currently a possibility, could again be possible in the future, at which
point waivers could be transitioned into provisions of key WTO
agreements.
As an alternative to rules imposed by multilateral institutions,
some would suggest that market-based measures offer a more efficient
way to address climate change issues. It is clear, however, that as they
stand, such measures are inadequate, as they are often voluntary in
nature and may include accommodations that undermine the efficacy
of the rules.1 27 Where the private sector is in charge of setting its own
restrictions and imposing measures that may decrease its profits, real
change is unlikely to be achieved. Capitalism does not incentivize
behavior that contravenes profit seeking.
Another alternative to multilateralism, and one that is
increasingly being adopted by countries around the world, is the
inclusion of climate change and environmental provisions in regional
trade agreements.1 2 8 Writing broadly about the life cycle of
multilateralism, Harlan Cohen argues that "as multilateral
institutions deepen, the best strategies to achieve global solutions may
be ones that encourage competition rather than foster cooperation.
Regional, club, and national strategies may need to pick up where
multilateralism

leaves

off."1

29

Cohen

recognizes,

however,

that

narrowly focused multilateral agreements could be valuable in
30
advancing future negotiations.1 This tendency toward regionalism
poses a particular challenge in the context of climate change, where
environmental chapters in regional trade agreements are rather scant

126. Id. at 15.
127. See, e.g., Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Carbon Offsetting as a Trade Related Market
Based Measure for Aircraft Engine Emissions, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 425, 425-43 (2017)
(discussing the inefficacy of the Resolution adopted by the International Civil Aviation
Organization in 2016 to reduce emissions by civil aircraft).
128. Droege, supranote 48, at 197.
129. Harlan G. Cohen, Multilateralism's Life-Cycle, 112 AM. J. INT'L L. 47, 50
(2018).
130. Id. at 65.
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in terms of obligations and act more as feel-good placeholders than as
substantive requirements for parties to these agreements. 3 1 They
cannot act as a substitute for global action.
There are three main types of environmental and climate
protections in regional trade agreements: (1) general environmental
provisions that do not mention climate change but instruct parties to
maintain a high level of environmental protection; (2) provisions that
aim to promote or facilitate trade and investment in "climate-relevant
sectors"; and (3) provisions "aimed at deepening cooperation on climate
change between the parties to the agreement." 132 Given how
exhortative most of these provisions are, it seems unlikely that even a
network of regional trade agreements all with robust environmental
protection chapters would succeed in achieving the global commitment
to climate change mitigation and adaptation required under the Paris
Agreement.

VII.

GOING BEYOND: ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE

Free trade is in many ways at odds with the fight against climate
change. In increasing the amount of trade that flows from the Global
South to the Global North, negative externalities arising from
emissions and other forms of pollution are ignored in favor of the
relative cheapness of the goods, itself a product of the low wages in the
Global South countries.13 3 Land grabs by multinational corporations
and investors from the Global North and China are taking place
throughout the Global South, with much of that land being converted
into intensive monoculture, which goes against the principle of
sustainable development. 134
At the heart of any potential success by a multilateral
environmental treaty lies sustainable development. Without giving
teeth to the concept that in particular balances the need for Global
South countries to experience economic development with the need to
conserve natural resources and reduce emissions, any measures to
mitigate climate change are doomed to failure. This requires
accounting for issues of poverty and wealth inequality in a way that
brings together the Global South and the Global North and that

131.

Eliason Development, supra note 123, at 645.

132.

Droege, supra note 48, at 227.

133.

Olivier De Schutter, Linking Trade and Climate Change: What Room for

Human Rights?, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAw PERSPECTIVE 201, 203-18 (2016).

134.

Oguamanam, supra note 49, at 249-50.
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includes marginalized communities as key stakeholders in the
process.1 3 5
Multilateral institutions cannot accomplish this work alone.
Grassroots efforts to bring global concepts to local communities are
crucial for obtaining stakeholder buy-in and appropriately educating
populations regarding environmental choices that they make. In India,
the National Green Tribunal operates as a specialized body with
136
This
scientific expertise necessary to hear environmental disputes.
tribunal, which has made scientific expertise central to the process, has
resulted in a significant shift in how India treats environmental cases,
including through the open acceptance and promotion of key
international environmental law principles, in particular sustainable
development, the precautionary principle, and the polluter pays
principles.1 3 7 Such efforts, if adopted by other countries, could go a long
way in localizing the global and in internationalizing domestic
environmental concerns.
As Global North countries move to mitigate and adapt to climate
change, the "green economy" becomes the catchphrase of the hour.
There are risks to embracing the phrase "green economy" without
clearly articulating what it is meant to express. To the Global North,
the "green economy" may become defmitionally and operationally
separated from the crucial element of sustainable development, with
13 8
potential negative consequences for countries of the Global South.
This leads to a risk that Global South countries will find their requests
for aid or for debt relief to be conditioned on adopting environmental
13 9
measures that fail to account for sustainable development needs.
Sustainable development must remain at the heart of any climate
change regime.
Global poverty raises additional challenges to successfully
implementing the goals of the Paris Agreement. Yet such poverty is not
inevitable. A paper by Chris Hoy and Andy Sumner argues that up to
three quarters of global poverty could be eliminated via redistribution
140
It is here that the insidious nature
of nationally available resources.
of the transnational capitalist class can be seen, through their
influence on the global economy and on institutions of trade and
finance, as well as through their domestic influence. As long as latestage capitalism continues unabated, global poverty will continue to
grow together with wealth inequality, making environmental concerns

135. Shawkat Alam & Jona Razzaque, Sustainable Development versus Green
Economy: The Way Forward?,in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL
SOUTH, supra note 44, at 609-23.
136. Gitanjali Nain Gill, Environmental Justice in India: The National Green
Tribunal and Expert Members, 5 TRANSNAT'L ENVTL. L. 175, 177 (2016).
137. Id. at 177, 184.
138. Khor, supranote 48.
139. Id. at 3.
140. Chris Hoy & Andy Sumner, Global Poverty and Inequality: Is There New
Capacity for Redistribution in Developing Countries?, 7 J. GLOBALIZATION & DEV. 117,
117-18 (2016).
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of lower priority, even where failure to act may have catastrophic
consequences for our planet and for humanity.

VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article does not wish to suggest that violating WTO rules is
an ideal solution, nor that this should become the way forward, thus
diluting the multilateral rules-based system in some last-ditch effort
to rescue it. Rather, this Article aims to offer ways that the existing
structures can be used to ensure that in the area of climate change,
countries have as much flexibility as necessary to meet their targets
and to fight the biggest challenge they have ever collectively faced.
In particular, building on the focus on sustainable development
and environmental protection in the preamble to the WTO, the WTO
can potentially position itself as a facilitator and enforcer of
environmental rules and measures in tandem with the Paris
Agreement. Developing countries will be disproportionally affected by.
the effects of climate change, yet lack resources to adapt to and to
mitigate them. Developed countries will also face significant
challenges. The solution to these challenges lies in the novel S&DT
provisions of the TFA and the possibility of incorporating those into a
new trade and climate change agreement, and in the application of
waivers adopted by the WTO General Council.
Without enforcement mechanisms, the success of the Paris
Agreement seems doubtful. Negotiating an international body to
oversee the implementation of national climate change mitigation and
adaptation measures would be daunting, even in an international
climate less hostile to cooperation. The least intrusive, most effective
solution to the enforcement issue rests with the mechanisms already
available in the WTO. The future of the WTO may lie in expanding its
scope and continuing to develop the S&DT provisions that made the
Trade Facilitation Agreement such a powerful new tool.
The WTO's S&DT provisions together with the social welfare goals
enshrined in the GATT and the WTO Agreement provide support for
both environmental and labor activism. Rather than being viewed as a
bulwark of neoliberalism, the WTO, with a proper rearrangement of
priorities, could serve as a beacon of progress. But for that to happen,
a rethinking of what sustainable development means must occur.

